We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions and their outcomes. This effect is known as 'intentional binding', and may provide feedback regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3). Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related (Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual's explicit appraisal of exertion, while the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated (physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource depletion and action control during strain.
Introduction
It is important that the human motor system can efficiently process events which are the result of its own actions, and to discriminate these from events in the world for which it is not responsible. For instance, if I kick a ball and it knocks over and smashes a vase of flowers, I know my action of kicking the ball was responsible for the vase smashing. Self-authored events like this tend to be easy to identify and this feeling that 'I did it' is known as a sense of agency. Some actions are more effortful than others; kicking a ball as hard as one can might break a vase, but so might brushing one's arm against it as one walks past it precariously positioned near the edge of a table. Both these actions have the same outcome, but might require the action monitoring system to respond differently in order to correctly ascribe agency. Here, we tested the role of physical and mental effort on the ascription of the sense of agency, using an implicit measure.
The attribution of agency
Self-agency is detected where there are cues relating to intentionality, volition, predictability and contiguity. An interesting phenomena occurring under these conditions is that actions and their effects are perceived as occurring closer together in time than they did, an effect known as temporal or intentional binding (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; see Moore & Obhi, 2012 , for a review). One theory of subjective time perception suggests that 'ticks' of an 'internal clock' give rise to our sense of time passing. The pace of this clock varies with arousal and motor activity (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Treisman, 1963; Wearden, Pilkington, & Carter, 1999) . When the pace of neural 'ticks' slows, durations appear shorter due to the accumulation of fewer pacing 'ticks'. Conversely, when the pace of the 'ticks' quickens, durations appear longer. Contexts characteristic of self-agency are believed to slow the pace of the internal clock as a consequence of motor prediction. This results in the shortening of subjective time and temporal binding (Wenke & Haggard, 2009 ). This may be an adaptive process to help to create a sense of agency, and in a general sense this process could assist the sensorimotor system to identify and monitor its effects and optimise performance (Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2015; Wenke & Haggard, 2009 q EEH and APB conceived the idea and all authors contributed to experimental design. EEH conducted the experiments and analysed the data. All authors interpreted the data. EEH and APB wrote the manuscript with critical revisions from SGE. This research was supported by a University of East Anglia PhD Studentship to EEH. The authors are grateful to Jelle Demanet for discussion regarding apparatus and procedure for Experiments 1 and 2.
